Privacy bills that would regulate online behavioral targeting are pending on the Hill right now, as is the Federal Trade Commission's proposal for a universal “do-not-track”
mechanism.
For the most part, officials are calling for companies to inform users about online behavioral targeting -- or tracking users as they surf the Web in order to serve them targeted
ads -- and to allow them to opt out. Across the pond, meanwhile, regulators are considering whether the EU's privacy laws require companies to obtain users' explicit consent to online tracking or
whether opt-out mechanisms suffice.
But even as lawmakers, advocates and industry executives debate the various proposals, they aren't addressing a more fundamental question about the ethics
of online tracking, two privacy experts argue in a new paper.
“The debate raging around DNT [do-not-track] and the specific details of its implementation disguises a more fundamental
disagreement among stakeholders about deeper societal values and norms,” Omar Tene, a fellow at the digital rights group Center for Democracy and Technology, and Jules Polonetsky, co-chair and
director of the think tank Future of Privacy Forum, write. “Unless policymakers address this underlying normative question -- is online behavioral tracking a social good or an unnecessary evil
-- they may not be able to find a solution for implementing user choice in the context of online privacy.”
The 55-page paper, “To Track or 'Do Not Track': Advancing Transparency and Individual Control,” goes on to examine various
tracking methods as well as regulatory proposals.
The authors argue that questions about mechanisms for notifying people about targeting and obtaining their consent can't be answered until
people make a judgment about whether the benefits of online behavioral targeting outweigh the potential downsides.
“Whether a given practice requires opt-in, opt-out or no consent; and
if so where and how choices should be presented; camouflage deep value judgments which have yet to be made,” the authors argue. “This is not to say that a value judgment needs to be as
stark as a binary choice between privacy and efficiency. On the contrary, a more nuanced equilibrium is needed taking into account the benefits of not only privacy rights but also access to
information and services, freedom of speech and economic efficiency.”